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THE USE OF GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS IN CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL CASES IN MONTANA
PHOTOGRAPHS-THE DOCTRINES OF ILLUSTRATIVE AND
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
Historically, there have been two rules governing the admissibility
of gruesome photographs. One rule held that photographs were merely
"illustrative evidence" and were part of the witness's oral testimony.
Accordingly, appellate courts ruled that a trial court judge had discre-
tion of admitting photographs into evidence. To determine admissibility,
the court balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect.
The other more liberal rule adopted by the courts recognized pho-
tographs as "demonstrative evidence," independent of oral testimony,
and evidence in themselves of what they depict. Under this assumption,
if photographs were competent, relevant, and material, they were ad-
missible and were not excluded merely because they were prejudicial.
Apparently, the first branch of the rule gained greater acceptance, lim-
iting the application of the second branch.1
The first of the rules considered oral evidence to be primary evi-
dence 2 and illustrative photographs were held to be secondary evidence. 3
Therefore, photographs were repetitious of the oral testimony. As a
result of accepting oral testimony to be the best evidence, photographs,
though more accurate evidence, were cumulative. This branch of the rule
presents a curious conflict because photographs are in fact better, more
accurate evidence than oral testimony of the object depicted. They are
"an eye witness who cannot forget and whose memory cannot be dis-
torted. "4 Consequently, on the basis of the doctrine, gruesome photographs
would give way to the less exact oral testimony because they would be
unnecessarily cumulative and, thus, prejudicial.
On the other hand, if photographs were considered to be demonstra-
tive evidence, not only were they independent of oral testimony, but they
were primary rather than secondary evidence.5 Montana's rules of evidence
'Dillard S. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.L. L. REv. 233 (1936) (here-
inafter cited as GARDNER, Camera].
2REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 93-301-7
states: "primary evidence is that kind of evidence which, under every possible cir-
cumstance, affords the greatest degree certainty of the fact in question. Thus,
a. written instrument is itself the best possible evidence of its existence and con-
tents. ''
'R.C.M. 1947 § 93-301-8 states: "Secondary evidence is that which is inferior to
primary. Thus, a copy of an instrument, or oral evidence of its contents, is see-
dary evidence-of the instrument and its contents.
'Gardner, Camera 235.
'R.C.M. 1947 § 93-301-5 states: There are fourt kinds of evidence: 1. The knowl-
edge of the Court; 2. testimony of witnesses; 3. Writings; 4. Other material ob-jects presented to the senses. Photographs, when considered to be demonstrative
evidence, would fall under subsection 4. R.C.M. 1947 § 93-301-6 states: There are
several degrees of evidence: 1. Primary and secondary. See, R.C.M. 1947 § 93-301-7,
note 2, supra.
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have preferred no one type of evidence over another within the same degree ;1
therefore, no repetition conflict has occurred when both oral testimony
and photographs were admitted to describe the same object. Considered
to be demonstrative evidence, photogrgaphs were primary or substantive
evidence of what they depicted and were admissible if competent. As a
form of real evidence, they were not otherwise inadmissible as being shock-
ing to the sensibilities of the jurors.
Montana has adopted the first branch of the doctrine and has treated
photographs as merely illustrative evidence. More recently, however,
cases have begun to acknowledged photographs to be demonstrative evi-
dence. Interpreting these cases pose three problems: 1. What is the rule
presently in Montana' 2. Is the case law moving toward the more liberal
doctrine and accepting photographs as substantive evidence? and 3. Is
treating photographs as demonstrative evidence the preferable rule?
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS GENERALLY
The first important question is whether photographs are appraised
to be demonstrative or illustrative evidence. Wigmore has defined photo-
graphs as a "witness's expression of the data observed by him and therein
communicated to the tribunal more accurately than words. "7 In Montana,
the rule governing the admissibility of photographs has been that they
stand upon the same footing as maps, plans, or diagrams;8 "whenever
relevant to describe a person, place, or thing, they are admissible for the
purpose of explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the court
and jury in understanding the case."9 This statement clearly has placed
Montana as adopting the illustrative evidence branch of the doctrine.
Nevertheless, the rule controlling admissibility in Montana has been
growing more liberal. The rule as originally established in Stokes v. Long'"
required that 1. the person who took the picture to be shown to have
possessed the skill and knowledge to take such pictures accurately and 2.
that the picture in question be a fair representation of the situation or
condition which was the subject of inquiry. The Court further said a
"photograph is competent evidence to prove a condition which can be
shown by a presentation of that sort.""' In the Stokes case, it was shown
that practicing physicians who took the x-ray photographs understood
'Id.
7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 3 WIG IORE ON EVIDENCE § 792, at 178 (3d ed. 1940) [herein-
after cited WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
sStokes v. Long, 52 Mont. 470, 483, 159 P. 28, 33 (1916).
'Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmer's Co., 98 Mont. 48, 61, 37 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1934).
1052 Mont. at 485, 159 P. at 33. The plaintiff was suing the defendant, a doctor,
for malpractice in the treatment of a broken leg. The complaint alleged that the
leg was temporarily set so that it was shorter than before and also the plaintiff was
caused pain and suffering.
"Id.; State v. Jones, 48 Mont. 505, 139 P. 441 (1919). See, WIG-UiORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 790, at 893 (1st. ed. 1904).
[Vol. 30
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and were accustomed to using x-ray equipment; therefore it was not error
to allow the x-ray plates in evidence.12
In the most recent Montana case, Pickett v. Kyger,3 the court ruled
that the only positive requirement to establish the foundation for ad-
mitting the picture is that it correctly represent the scene it purports to
depict as viewed by the witness and that any changes in the picture be
pointed out. 14 Certainly, this rule has been properly updated to require
only a foundation showing the photograph's competency.
However, the Montana Supreme Court has adopted the following
position concerning the accuracy of photographs.
[I]t is not even necessary that the situation or condition should
be precisely the same, but it is sufficient that if the situation is
substantially unchanged, and even if the fact that there have been
changes in conditions, will not necessarily exclude a photograph
where the changes can be and are explained, so that the photograph,
as explained, will give a correct understanding of the condition
existing at the time to which the controversy relates."
In Teesdale v. Anchutz Drilling Co., the Court allowed photographs
of a water tank from which the plaintiff fell to be admitted in evidence.
The photographs were taken one year after the accident, after the water
tank had been moved to a different location and the alleged cause of in-
jury corrected. 17 Because the water tank was difficult to visualize, the
pictures enabled the court and jury to understand the conditions existing
at the time of the accident. Following a precedent set in McNair v.
Berger,i s the Court ruled that the photographs were admissible because
the change in conditions could be explained. The decision in Teesdale
1252 Mont. at 486, 159 P. at 33 (1916).
1125 St. Rptr. 218, 439 P.2d 57 (1968). Accord, Toole v. Paumie Pa-risan Dye House,
98 Mont. 91, 39 P.2d 965 (1944) ; McNair v. Berger, 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834
(1932).
"The requirement that the photograph is a fair representation of what it purports
to depict is, in fact, a requirement for establishing competency. One author has
noted that because the courts' have followed the general rule that photographs are
merely illustrative, the competency requirement has been overlooked or neglected.
The fact that Montana makes this a requirement indicates that its rule contains
parts of both doctrines, and that the court has not followed one doctrine or the
other completely. See, Gardner, Camera 235.
"McNair v. Berger, note 3, supra; 92 Mont. at 459, 15 P.2d 828. As quoted in Tees-
dale v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 138 Mont. 427, 439, 357 P.2d 4, 10 (1960). Accord,
Hackley v. Waldorf Hoerner Paper Products, 149 Mont. 286, 425 P.2d 712 (1967)
Gobel v. Rinio, 122 Mont. 235, 200 P.2d 700 (1948).
11138 Mont. 427, 357 P.2d 4 (1960).
"
1The plaintiff was hauling water to the drilling site of the defendant. The defend-
ant maintained and had exclusive control over a water tank and that tank was
equipped with a ladder on the side so that one might reach the top of the tank.
The tank had no water level gage so that the plaintiff in delivering water was re-
quired to climb up the ladder and look through a hole on top to check the water
level. The defendant had painted the tank and left loose a metal coupling to a
rubber hose. While climbing to the top of the tank the plaintiff took hold of the
coupling to swing himself up to the top. The coupling and hose parted and the
plaintiff fell to the ground suffering serious injuries.
IsNote 13, supra.
1.969]
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applied the liberal, or the demonstrative, branch of the doctrine. The Court
not only allowed testimony pointing out the changes in condition of,
the tank notwithstanding possible prejudice to the defendent, but also
the photographs were admitted as evidence in themselves of what they
depicted. The Court stated:
Therefore, the testimony which was presented as a foundation for
admission of the photographs was properly received. Even if such
testimony would tend to show antecedent negligence on the part
of the defendant this court is committed to the rule that evidence
may be admissible for one purpose but not for another, but if ad-
missible for any purpose, it may not be excluded. Edquest v. Tripp
& Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P. 2nd 637.!
On the basis of the liberal doctrine being recognized in Teesdale,2°
it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Court, in civil cases, has
begun to follow a more liberal policy toward admitting photographic
evidence. The fact that the Court used the language that "if evidence
is admissible for any purpose it may not be excluded. ''21 indicates that
it had appraised photographs to be demonstrative evidence. Had the
photographs been illustrative evidence, they would have been admissible
only as part of the oral testimony and would not have been evidence
in themselves of the condition of the water tank.
It may be inferred from the language in Teesdale that photographs
which are competent, relevant, and material are admissible, and possible
prejudice to the adverse party will not make them in admissible. Applying
this rule to gruesome photographs, if the picture were relevant, material,
and a proper foundation were laid to show its competency, the fact that
it was particularly shocking or inflamatory would not affect its admis-
sibility.
The second important question is the influence of the trial court's
discretion on the admissibility of gruesome photographs. The Montana
rule is still that the admissibility of gruesome photographs is within the
discretion of the trial court.2 2
An interesting study was made concerning the reaction of judges to
repulsive or gruesome evidence at the 1967 Indiana Judicial Conference. 23
The report attempted to categorize the responses of the judges to the gru-
some exhibits shown to them. The reason given for this categorization was:
... [B]ecause in this species of law-making the immediate response
of a trial judge is almost always the last word on what the law it.
"138 Mont. at 440, 357 P.2d at 11.
"Id.
211d.
-'Fulton v. Choutcau County Farmer's Co., supra; Picket v. Kyger, spra. See also,
9 PRooi, OF FACTS 147-152 (1961).
'Thomas L. Shaffer, Judges, Repulsive Evidence and Ability to Respond, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 503 (1968). The Conference was in the Continuing Education Center
of the University of Notre Dame, October 18-21, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Shaffer,
Repulsive Evidence]. See, id. 503 n. 2.
I Vol. 30
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Rulings on demonstrative evidence is more closely related to im-
mediate response ... than to intellectual rationalization that char-
acterizes appellate law. This relationship is especially important
bceause rulings on demonstrative evidence are probably as immune
from appellate interference as any that a trial judge is likely to
make.'
The first hypothesis of the Report was, "the terms in which evidence
rulings are made-particular evidence rulings on repulsive real and demon-
strative evidence-have less to do with prejudice than with accuracy.
2 5
It was noted that though the appellate law was couched in terms of bal-
ancing the prejudicial effect against the probative value, and though the
trial judges also talked in terms of balancing, they looked in fact at the
evidence more in terms of its accuracy. If the evidence accurately repre-
sented a fact, that is, was competent, the judges regarded it as admissible
despite the horror it evoked in them.
26
Two points should be emphasized from this report: 1. that the
judges did not balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect
and 2. that the test applied for determining admissibility was one
of competency. Therefore, the judges treated the photographs as demon-
strative evidence and not as illustrative evidence.
III. ADMISSION OF GRUESOME EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Although the Montana Court has held categorically in Fulton v.
Chouteau County Farmer's Co. 2 7 that photographs stand upon the same
footing as maps, plans and diagrams, one writer has contended that this
statement is "over simplified. '28 It was his argument that photographs
stand on the same footing as maps or diagrams in that the preliminary
foundation required that they be verified by some witness. Otherwise,
photographs differ from maps, diagrams and models in three distinct
ways:
First, it is recognized that while the average juror will accept
any photograph as correct, he will not have the same faith in a
drawing because he knows that it is entirely the creation of some
man's mind and hand. Therefore, because of the average juror's
blind faith in photography, a small degree of inaccuracy in a photo-
graph may justify its exclusion from evidence. ...
Second, the vital mirror-like appearance of a photograph makes
it capable of inciting passion and prejudice in the jury, whereas a
lifeless map or drawing of the same subject will rarely be excluded
because of its prejudicial nature . . . there are hardly any condi-
tions under which a map or drawing could be said to arouse passion
or prejudice.
21Shaffer, Repulsive Evidence 503.
Id., at 504.
'Id.
'Fulton v. Choutcau County Farmer's Co., note 9, supra.
'Charles C. Scott, Medicolegal Photography, 18 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 173, 189, n. 8
(1946).
I99
5
Stratton: Notes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1968
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Finally, photographs frequently are recognized by the courts
as a kind of eyewitness, whereas hand-drawn maps or pictures
are never given this attribute ...after the proper foundation has
been laid by showing that a photograph is an accurate representa-
tion of the thing in question, it speak swith a certain probative
force in itself.'
For the above reasons, courts have probably ruled more narrowly on
admitting photographic evidence where there was questionable competency,
materiality, relevancy, or insufficient probative value.
The leading criminal case in Montana discussing the admissibility
of gruesome evidence was State v. Bischert.3 0 The Bischerts were tried and
convicted for manslaughter of their five-month old child. The cause of
death was proved by expert testimony to be starvation. During the trial
several black-and-white photographs and one colored picture were shown
to the jury on a screen in the darkened courtroom. The pictures por-
trayed "ghastly and gruesome looking sores or scars, ""' alleged to have
been caused by dermatitis burns which in no way went to the proof of
starvation. Furthermore, the pathologist was able to testify as to the
starvation of the child without use of photographs. The question of pro-
viding medical care was not in issue. Therefore, the photographs were
neither relevant, nor material, to ths issues before the court.
The Court, in Bischcrt, reaffirmed its doctrine established in Fulton"
that :
... photographs stand on the same footings as diagrams, maps,
plans, and the like, and as a general rule, whenever relevant to
describe a person, place, or thing, they are admissible for the
purpose of explaining and applying the evidence as assisting the
court and jury in understanding the case. '
The Court, however, qualified this statement by acknowledging that "pho-
tographs that are calculated to arouse the sympathies of the jury are
properly excluded, particularly if they are not substantially necessary or
instructive to show material facts or conditions.'' 4 The Court concluded
that because the pathologist was fully able to present his testimony without
the use of photographs, "their purpose could only arouse the human
feelings of the jury without aiding them in further understanding the
crime charged. "5
The rule the Court seemingly contemplated was that photographs
"Id. at 189-190.
3131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969; 131 Mont. 608, 308 P.2d 973 (1957).
"
3Id. at 159, 308 P.2d at 973.
":Note 9, supra.
3State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 159, 308 P.2d at 973. Quoted from Fulton v. Chou-
teau County Farmer's Co., 98 Mont. at 61, 37 P.2d at 1029. Both Fulton and Stokes
v. Long, note 8, supra, are leading cases in Montana. The rule cited in these cases
is found in 22 C.J. Evidence §1115 at 913 (1920). See also, 20 Am. JUR. Evidence
§729, at 609 (1939).
34131 Mont. at 159, 308 P.2d at 973. 20 Am[. JUR. Evidence, note 33, supra.
1131 Mont. at 160, 308 P.2d at 973.
[ Vol. 30
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which were neither relevant nor material, nor which in any way are
substantially necessary for the understanding of the court and jury,
should be excluded if they were gruesome and calculated to inflame the
jury. Nevertheless, the rule advanced by the Court was clouded by quoting
from 20 Am. Jur. Evidence, Section 729,3 6 the last sentence of the para-
graph. The paragraph discussed the relevancy and materiality require-
nents of photographic exhibits and stated that only where they were
neither material or relevant and tended to divert the minds of the jury
to improper considerations should they be excluded.3 7 In comparison,
the last sentence from that paragraph discussed gruesomeness which was
calculated to arouse the sympathies or prejudices of the jury. As excised,
the quotation overemphasized the prejudicial results of the photographs
and ignored the questions of materiality and relevancy.
The Court's decision in Bischert is open to two conflicting construc-
tions. Oil the one hand, the Court looked to the photographs as merely
illustrative evidence of the part of the pathologist's oral testimony. The
Court found that the pathologist was "fully able to explain his findings
without the use of photographs. 3 8 This language clearly indicated an adop-
tion of the illustrative evidence doctrine. Even if the photographs had
been useful in the oral testimony, they would have been prejudicial be-
cause of the cumulative effects.
On the other hand, the Court also used language showing their intent
to treat the photographs as demonstrative evidence. It noted that the
photographs were neither relevant or material to the issues before them.
'TPhe charge was the failure to provide food.
"It should be pointed out that there was no charge of failure to
provide medical care. . . . They [the photographs] show ghastly
and gruesome looking sores or scars alleged to have been caused by
dermatitis burns which in no way go to the proof of starvation. When
the purpose is to inflame the minds of the jury or excite feelings
rather than to enlighten the jury as to any fact, it should be ex-
cluded.'
Speaking in this manner, the Court recognized that the photographs them-
selves had independent substantive value. The language implied that, had
they been material and relevant, they would have been admissible.
"Note 34, supra. The full text reads: "Relevancy of Photographs: Prejudicial Char-
acter. It is always essential to the right to introduce a photograph in evidence
that it have a relevant and material bearing upon some matter in controversy at the
trial, and the party offering such evidence should give proof of its relevancy to the
issue before the jury. A photograph which is entirely irrelevant and immaterial to
and issue in the cause and which is of such a character as to divert the minds of
the jury to improper or irrelevant considerations should be excluded from evidence.
The determination of relevancy and materiality is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge. Photographs that are calculated to arouse the sympathies or prejudices
of the jury are properly excluded if they are not substantially necessary or instructive
to show material facts or conditions.'
I'Id. CF., 29 Am. JuR. 2d Evidence §§ 787-788, at 861-862 (1967).
11131 Mont. at 160, 308 P.2d at 973.
"Id. at 159-160, 308 P.2d at 973.
19691
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In Bischert, the Court did not recognize photographs as either illustra-
tive or demonstrative evidence, but excised rules applicable to each doc-
trine and applied them separately to the facts of the situation. Because
of this application of mutually inconsistent rules, the Bischert case left
uncertainty as to which doctrine would control the admission of photo-
graphic evidence in criminal cases.
Following Bischert was State v. Campbell.40 There, the defendant
was charged with first degree murder. A photograph was taken of the
deceased victim on the mortuary table and showed the wounds causing
death. The Court construed the rule established in Bischert to mean that
a photograph is properly excluded "when the purpose of an exhibit is to
i flame the minds of the jury or to excite their feelings rather than to
enlighten the jury as to any fact. .... ",41
The Court held that there was no evidence that the photograph com-
plained of was calculated "to inflame the minds of the jury.42 The pur-
pose foa admitting the photograph was to show the position of the wounds.
Two points are embodied in this construction of the rule in Bischert.
The first point is that the photographs were admitted as real evidence of
the facts which they portrayed-an application of the demonstrative evi-
dence doctrine. The second point is that the Court used the demonstrative
type language from Bischert when discussing the rule. The Campbell
case indicated that the Court was adopting a doctrine treating photographs
as real evidence.
In State v. Rollins, 43 the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed their
decision in Bischert, but held that it had no application in the instant case.
In Rollins, the defendant assaulted his former wife and another man and
his wife who were with her. It was alleged that the defendant hit the
other man in the cheek with a rifle, knocked him to the ground, and then
shot him in the neck. Rollins alleged that the rifle accidentally discharged
when he struck him. The pictures sought to be admitted showed the neck
wound after it had been cleaned and dressed.
Not only did the Court find the photograph to be neither gruesome
nor particularly distasteful, but it also held that Bischert did not apply
because the photographs were both relevant and material to the issue in
question. Because the photographs clearly showed powder burns on the
neck-burns which were not visible at the time of trial-they were perti-
mrnt to the issue of whether, as alleged by Rollins, the gun discharged at
the time of striking the other man.
However, the Court expanded the rule to require judges, in passing
40146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d at 978 (1967).
'Id. at 261, 405 P.2d at 984.
42Id.
4'149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d at 962 (1967).
[Vol. 30
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on admissibility to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial ef-
fects.44 Again, the contradiction recurred as to which doctrine the Court
was applying for determining the admissibility of gruesome photographs.
The Court appeared to admit the photographs as real evidence of the
wound and the powder burns which existed at the time of the assault.
Nevertheless, the Court used the balancing language associated with a
doctrine of illustrative evidence.
45
The most recent decision following the precedent established in
Bischert is State v. Warrick. In that case, photogrpahs were taken of the
defendant's wife shortly after her admission to the hospital. It was alleged
that she had been beaten by her husband. The defendant objected to the
admission of the photographs because they were technically defective in
coloration and because the court had permitted the testifying doctor to
voice the opinion that the injuries were actually worse than depicted in
the exhibits. The appellant urged that the doctor's testimony allowed the
jury to speculate on the extent of the actual injuries.
The Court in Warrick made an important observation which clarified
the rule in Bischert:
This court held in State v. Rollins that color photographs that have
probative value are admissible. The case of State v. Bischert relied
on by the appellant is not in point. In that case the photographs did
not support the State's theory that the child starved to death, but
tended to support a collateral issue not in the case, i.e. that the
parents failed to provide medical attention. The photographs showed
'ghastly and gruesome' looking sores that in no way went to the
proof of starvation. [citations omitted.]47
This is probably the clearest statement made by the Court which in-
dicated its intention that the rule in Montana should be that where photo-
graphs are material, relevant, and compenent, they are admissible even
though they may be gruesome and tend to inflame the passions or preju-
dices of the jury. In other words, Montana had adopted the demonstrative
evidence doctrine for determining the admissibility of photographic evi-
dence.
In Warrick, not only did the language evidence the adoption of the
more liberal substantive doctrine, but also the fact that the Court allowed
gruesome photographs into evidence which were clearly repetitive of the
oral testimony. On the other hand, they would have been prejudicial if
the illustrative evidence doctrine had been applied. On the basis of War-
"1Id. at 484, 428 P.2d at 464.
'The Court referred to weighing of the probative value against the prejudicial ef-
fects only in the Rollins case. Nor did the Court refer to the test in the subsequent
case of State v. Warrick, infra. Because the reference to the balancing test was
isolated, its importance is diminished. And, to the contrary, the Court in Rollins,
treated the photographs have demonstrative evidence.
'"25 St. Rptr. 701, 446 P.2d at 920 (1968).
Id. at 705, 446 P.2d at 920.
19691
9
Stratton: Notes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1968
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
rick, along with the other cases construing Bischert,48 it is reasonable to
conclude that presently accepted doctrine in Montana is that photographs
arc demonstrative evidence and are admissible when proved to be com-
petent, relevant, and material; the mere fact that they are gruesome does
not render them inadmissible.49
It should be noted that Montana case law has been, in terminology
but not substance, in accord with the decisions in California which have
held that gruesome photographs are inadmissible where: 1. they are
neither relevant nor material; 2. the prejudicial effect outweighs the
probative effect; and 3. the principal effect of the photograph is to
arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury.50
Although Montana has apparently recognized the demonstrative evi-
dence doctrine, the statement of the rule still remains obscured by the
conflicting language used to state the rule. Presently, the rule as stated
tends to sound as though Montana law is consistent with the doctrine of
illustrative evidence.
The better statement of the rule was found in the Colorado decisions.
Their rule expressed that photographs were not inadmissible in evidence
merely because they present vividly to jurors details of a shocking crime
or tend to arouse passion or prejudice.5 The correlative to the rule stated
that photographs were inadmissible only when they did not illustrate or
make clear some issue of the case and were of such character as to prejudice
the jury.5 2 The Colorado rule expressed the doctrine clearly that photo-
graphs were treated as substantive evidence. They were denied admission
only when they were neither material nor relvant. As expressed, this rule
eliminated the uncertainty caused by the discretionary judgment of the
trial court in applying the balancing test of probative value against preju-
dicial effect.
Finally, in the area of criminal application, it should be pointed out
that there appears to be a distinct difference between the attitudes of
civil court judges and criminal court judges toward admitting gruesome
photographs. 53 The study of the Conference54 indicated that even though
the issues may have been the same in a criminal trial or in a civil case,
constitutional due-process of law and a relatively more intense level of
review imposed a stricter standard of admissibility in criminal cases.
4sSee, State v. Campbell and State v. Rollins, supra.
103 AM. Jur. TRIALS § 30, at 36 (1965).
"People v. Kemp, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361, 55 C.2d 458, 359 P.2d 913 (1961); People v.
Love, 53 C.2d 843, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705 (1960); People v. Carter, 48 C.2d
737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Scarborough, 171 C.A.2d 186, 340 P.2d 76(1959).
"Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
'
2potts v. People, 124 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d 739 (1945). Claxton v. People, 434 P.2d
407 (1967). See, 29 AM. JuR.2d Evidence § 787, at 760-761 (1967).
Indiana Trial Judges' Conference, Shaffer, Repulsive Evidence, note 23, supra.
',Shaffer, Repulsive Evidence 504.
[ Vol. 30
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However, some of the judges felt that the only difference between civil
and criminal cases was in the character of the factual issues involved.
55
IV. ADMISSION OF GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS IN CIVIL CASES
Montana has not yet faced the question of admissibility of gruesome
evidence in civil litigation. However, the Montana Supreme Court, in
Fulton and subsequent cases including Teesdale,5 1 indicated an intention
to follow the more liberal demonstrative evidence doctrine toward the
admissibility of photographs. Further support for this position may be
found in Graham v. Helean,5 7 where the claimant in a workman's com-
pensation case offered to the Industrial Accident Board colored photo-
graphs taken of his injuries. Part of the injuries was facial anesthesia.
The court found that the Board properly refused admission of the pic-
tures which only served to portray the extent of the injuries visible in
the photograph and the type of treatment applied at the time the pictures
were taken. To this extent, the photographs were irrelevant to determine
the extent of the disability. 58 The decision in Graham was in accord with
the demonstrative evidence rule that photographs which are neither rele-
vant nor material are inadmissible. In this case, the court accepted the
fact that photographs were substantive evidence but noted that these
particular photogrgaphs had no relevant probative value.
Generally, the rule governing civil cases is the same as the one gov-
erning criminal cases:
If photographs which disclose gruesome aspects of an accident
or incident are not relevant or material, nor aid the jury's under-
standing and solely serve to inflame or prejudice the minds of thejurors, they are properly inadmissible.'
A recent Colorado decision shows the proper application of the rule
in civil cases. In Jensen v. South Adams County Water and Sanitation
District,6 ° the court held that pictures of an injured party in a hospital
bed had no probative value and were properly excluded. But, it was held
that photographs of the pelvic region of the injured plaintiff which were
offered to show the extent of the plaintiff's injuries were improperly
excluded. The exclusion had been on the grounds that they might have
had emotional overtones or might have been embarrassing to the jurors.
On the other hand, it is without question that lurid photographs,
paraphernalia, and other trappings of showmanship should not be used
to enhance the verdict. 61 It has been suggested by one writer that where
ld. at 512 n. 19.
'Notes 7 and 8, supra.
17143 Mont. 552, 393 P.2d 46 (1964).
mId. at 559, 393 P.2d (1962).
5929 AM. JUR.2d Evidence § 787, at 760-761 (1967).
w149 Colo. 102, 368 P.2d 209 (1962).
'Jenkins v. Associated Transport Co., 330 F.2d 706 (6th. Cir. 1964).
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gruesome evidence is received it should be the duty of both sides to sub-
mit precautionary instructions.12 At the 1967 Indiana Trial Judges' Con-
ference, most of the judges agreed that they should try, "even on their
own motiov, to prepare jurors for the experience [of viewing repulsive
evidence] by warning them, or asking if any had a weak stomach. '"63
The article went on to say:
(This was an expression of two facts, I thought:
(1) Judges are probably more hardened to the revulsion of death
in the courtroom than jurors are, or at least judges think that this
is true. (2) The threshold of revulsion in the average man is not
the test of the 'law' of real and demonstrative evidence; thesejudges were willing to attempt to prepare jurors for an unpleasant
experience; they were not, however, willing to relieve them of the
experience.)'
The courts which rely on the balancing effect between probative
value and prejudicial effect as a test for admitting photographs have
-tated that photographs may be excluded bccause they produce undue
prejudice or confuse the jury, or for some other policy reason; the harm
which results from its reception outweighs its probative value."
The difficulty with the balancing rule is that the determination of
gruesomeness and the weighing of value is left solely to the discretion of
the trial court judge. The rule is subjective rather than objective, and
its application will vary, therefore, from court to court according to the
different judge's view of gruesomeness. Since there is no certainty as to
which gruesome photograph any one judge will allow into evidence, this
balancing rule has the effect of being no rule at all. A practicing attorney
will have no means of determining whether his photographs will be deemed
admissible.
On the other hand, the doctrine that gruesomeness does not render
inadmissible real evidence which otherwise has probative value 6  and is
competent lends certainty to a rule of admissibility. This liberal doctrine
eliminates the instability which the subjective trial judge's discretion
created. From this standpoint, treating photographic evidence as demon-
strative or real evidence, rather than illustrative evidence, is the better
view.
Two benefits accrue from al)plying the more liberal doctrine. One
benefit is that the rule presents an objective standard for determining
admissibility. The other benefit is that the best evidence is admitted rather
than the less accurate oral testimony.
'MELVIN AT. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS, § 312 at 687 (Abr. ed. 1963).
Shaffer, Repulsive Evidence. See, Shaffer, Bullits, Bad Florins and Old Boots, 39
NOTRE DAME LAwYER 20, 1963).
"Id. at 504.
"5Rich v. Cooper, 234 Or. 300, 380 P.2d 613 (1963).
"Herwitz v. Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority, 233 N.E. 2d 726 (1968).
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The doctrine, in contradistinction to the restrictiveness of the more
conservative illustrative doctrine, places before the court and jury the
greatest amount of probative evidence. In this way, the demonstrative
doctrine of admissibility falls within the spirit of the Rules of Civil
Procedure by providing full and fair disclosure of all probative facts.
The rule for admissibility in Montana should, therefore, follow the
criminal law rule set forth in Bischert and construed in Warrick. Based
on the Court's decision in Teesdale, the rule should be stated that photo-
graphs are deemed to be demonstrative or substantive evidence and that
if they are admissible for any purpose they may not be excluded.
6 7
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. Bischert, the Montana Supreme Court did not clearly and
decisively establish a rule for determining the admissibility of gruesome
evidence. However, subsequent cases have developed the rule, specially
in State v. Warrick, to the extent that a reasonable conclusion of the rule
is that photographs are admissible as demonstrative evidence and are not
excluded merely because they are shocking to the sensibilities of the
jurors. Photographs, like other real evidence, may be inadmissible where
they are neither competent, relevant, or material, or where the principal
effect of the photographs is-calculated to arouse the passions or prejudices
of the jury.
The rule as stated does not preclude the possibility that photographs
may be prejudicial where there is abuse. Even though photographs are
not cumulative of the oral testimony, they may be cumulative in their own
right. If the photographs depict a particularly gruesome scene, too many
photographs may have a cumulative effect which will be prejudicial, and
some of the photographs which are repetitious should be excluded.
Because Montana has no case law governing admissibility of grue-
some evidence in civil cases, it may be concluded that the rule will follow
the doctrine established in the criminal cases.
The doctrine and rule should be stated affirmatively. The better
expression of the rule is that photographs are admissible as real evi-
dence of what they depict and that they are not rendered inadmissible
merely because they bring vividly to the jurors the details of a grue-
some or shocking accident or crime.
REX B. STRATTON, III
.7138 Mont. at 440, 357 P.2d at 11.
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